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 Duck hooks, banana balls, and shanks.1 Ridiculously bad shots such as these 
have shamed many an unsuspecting golfer, even the vaunted Tiger Woods.2 Amid 
the laughter and shame, one of these poorly hit shots can easily end up in a sand trap, 
the woods, or even in some poor fellow’s living room.3 It is therefore quite obvious 
that a struck golf ball can wreak havoc as it is launched into the great unknown.4 It 
is this very uncertainty of the game that makes golf challenging, and even occasionally 
thrilling.5 Although wayward golf shots can, and do, result in serious injuries, golf 
cannot be categorized as a hazardous game. Over the centuries, a set of golfing 
etiquette rules has evolved that protects golfers from the inherent risk of getting 
walloped by a poorly struck shot, thereby greatly reducing the probability of injury.6 
1. Terrible, yet common, golf shots include the “slice” (ball fades to the right for a right-handed player—an 
especially grotesque slice is referred to as a banana shot), “hook” (shot is pulled sharply left—a severe 
hook is called a “duck-hook”), and “shank” (ball is struck by the heel of the club and darts sharply right 
at a low trajectory). Poor Golf Shots, NCGolfers.com (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.ncgolfers.com/north-
carolina/355/poor-golf-shots/. Possible causes of miserable shots such as these include lack of skill, lack 
of concentration, lack of hand-eye coordination, inebriation, worn club grip, slippery hands, trembling 
legs, distraction by course-dwelling critters, force majeure . . . well, you get the picture. 
2. A memorable shank by Tiger Woods occurred at the 2007 British Open. Errant Shot by Woods Hits a 
Spectator, Golf.com (July 21, 2007), http://www.golf.com/golf/tours_news/article/0,28136,1645722,00.
html. Jennifer Wilson required stitches after she was ‘beaned’ by Tiger’s ball when he badly missed an 
approach shot. Id. Ms. Wilson was walloped in the head while watching the action at the par-five sixth 
hole at the Carnoustie Golf Club. Id. Her husband, Cecil Wilson, recounted the incident: “We were 
standing 30 yards short of the green and I said to Jennifer: ‘Get your crash helmet on, Tiger’s coming . . . . 
I could not believe it when Jennifer then got ‘clunked,’ but he [Tiger] does go off line from time to 
time.’” Id. (quoting Cecil Wilson) (internal quotation marks omitted). Woods continued on to par the 
hole. Id. Cecil Wilson explained, “My wife did him a favor, she headed it back in for him.” Id.
3. Who could forget the legendary scene in the cult classic golf movie Caddyshack, in which golf ace Ty 
Webb (played by actor Chevy Chase) badly shanks a shot through the window of assistant greenkeeper 
Carl Spackler’s (played by actor Bill Murray) very humble abode? Caddyshack (Orion Pictures Corp. 
1980). The ball comes to rest on a slice of pie atop Spackler’s coffee table. Id. Webb proceeded to take a 
drop over his shoulder and played his next shot out through Spackler’s other window. Id.
4. “[I]n some ways, hitting a golf ball can be more dangerous than firing a gun or throwing a stone since 
one is likely to have more control over the direction of a gunshot or a thrown stone than a golf ball.” 
Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968), aff ’d per curiam, 
312 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Term 2d Dep’t 1970), aff ’d, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep’t 1971).
5. Such unpredictability inevitably leads to frustration. Throughout the annals of golf history, legendary 
professionals have reacted to their off-line shots with the occasional temper tantrum. Perhaps the most 
notorious was Thomas Henry Bolt, who won fifteen PGA Tour events, as well as the 1958 U.S. Open. 
A memorable photo shows Bolt getting ready to hurl his driver like a javelin into a water hazard at the 
eighteenth hole at Cherry Hills Golf Course during the 1960 U.S. Open. Bolt claimed he was trying to 
“clobber the noisy carp in the lake.” Cliff Schrock, Passings of 2008: Remembering Tempestuous Tommy, 
The Real McKay, Ol’ Sarge and More, Golf Digest, Feb. 2009, at 162, available at http://www.golfdigest.
com/magazine/2009-02/passings. One bit of advice from Mr. Bolt: “[A]lways throw the club ahead of 
you so you can pick it up on your way.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Bolt also “never threw a 
club that didn’t deserve it.” Id. (quoting Tommy Bolt) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Golf, unlike most sports, is not played under the watchful eye of a referee or umpire. Therefore, a golfer 
relies on his or her fellow golfers to abide by the rules of the game, thereby promoting safe play. Since 
1897, the United States Golf Association (USGA) has teamed up with the Royal & Ancient Golf Club 
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Of paramount significance among these rules is the player’s duty to immediately 
shout a warning when he or she plays a ball in a direction where there is a danger of 
hitting someone.7 To varying degrees, courts around the country have adopted the 
golfer’s duty to warn, finding golfers who breach that duty liable because they 
unreasonably increase the risk of injury.8 As explained in past cases by the New York 
Court of Appeals, a golfer in New York “has a duty to give a timely warning to other 
persons within the foreseeable ambit of danger” prior to taking a shot.9
 In Anand v. Kapoor, the New York Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) was 
presented with the question of whether a golfer owed a duty to provide warning of 
his intent to take a shot, and whether he can be held liable for his wayward shot for 
failure to do so.10 The court issued a terse, sixteen-sentence opinion in which it 
answered these questions in the negative, choosing to affirm summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant solely on assumption of the risk grounds.11 The Court of 
Appeals declared the way in which the plaintiff was injured, getting hit by a shanked 
shot, to be “a commonly appreciated risk of golf.”12 In so ruling, the court effectively 
brushed aside the well-established rule in New York that, before hitting a ball, “[a] 
golfer has a duty to give a timely warning to other persons within the foreseeable 
ambit of danger” by yelling “fore.”13 The Court of Appeals chose not to examine the 
New York Appellate Division, Second Department’s (“Second Department”) 
erroneous decision to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff ’s complaint despite unresolved 
in St. Andrews, Scotland, to “write[], interpret[] and maintain[]” the rules of golf in order to “guard the 
tradition and integrity of the game.” Rules and Decisions, USGA, http://www.usga.org/Rule-Books/
Rules-of-Golf/Rule-01/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). The two organizations have combined forces to 
write and implement The Rules of Golf and Decisions on the Rules of Golf. See id.
7. Other basic safety rules include: “[p]layers should ensure that no one is standing close by or in a position 
to be hit by the club, the ball or any stones, pebbles, twigs or the like when they make a stroke or 
practice swing”; “[p]layers should not play until the players in front are out of range”; and “[p]layers 
should always alert greenstaff nearby or ahead when they are about to make a stroke that might endanger 
them.” Golf Etiquette 101, USGA, http://www.usga.org/etiquette/tips/Golf-Etiquette-101/ (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2011).
8. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
9. Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475, 479 (1972).
10. 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 948.
13. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d Dep’t 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Jenks, 30 
N.Y.2d at 479), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946. Shouting “fore” is just a simple way to yell “watch out ahead or 
watch out before.” Affidavit of Golf Professional Thomas W. Tatnall para. 4(f), Anand v. Kapoor, 
No. 15942/05, 2007 WL 7308649 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County May 7, 2007), aff ’d, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 
aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (No. 15942/05), 2007 WL 6890261. Such a warning cry forewarns golfers of 
incoming golf balls and impending danger. Id. The term may have evolved from the ancient term 
“forecaddie,” a person who would accompany a group around the course who would often go forward in 
order to be in a position to pinpoint the location of the group’s shots. Id. Golfers “universally understand 
that ‘fore’ means ‘ahead’ and is a warning to those ahead of the golfer who shouts it.” Id.
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material factual issues.14 By doing so, the Court of Appeals seemingly blessed the 
Second Department’s improper ruling that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff did not 
stand within the foreseeable danger zone and had assumed the risk of his injury 
merely by participating in the game.15
 This case comment contends that the decision to grant summary judgment for 
the defendant was improper because triable questions of fact existed as to whether 
the defendant unreasonably increased the risk of his playing partner’s injury. More 
specifically, a jury question existed as to whether the defendant, who admittedly 
failed to ascertain the plaintiff ’s position before hitting and did not adequately warn 
the plaintiff of his impending shot,16 affirmatively created hidden risks of injury that 
the plaintiff neither appreciated nor consented to. The Second Department reached 
its erroneous decision to affirm dismissal of the complaint because it ignored material 
factual disputes in the trial record, misconstrued binding precedent, and relied on 
inapplicable cases. Furthermore, in affirming the Second Department’s improper 
legal reasoning solely on assumption of the risk grounds,17 the Court of Appeals not 
only managed to confuse the discrete issues of negligence presented by the case, but 
also incorrectly expanded the controversial assumption of the risk defense to protect 
a golfer who carelessly created hidden risks of injury. In so doing, the court effectively 
gutted the player’s duty to warn those that stand within the foreseeable zone of 
danger because the fair import of the court’s ruling is that the player who stands 
outside of the intended line of f light can no longer recover for his or her injuries 
caused by an errant shot. As a result of the court’s decision, golf in New York is sure 
to become a more hazardous pastime.
ii. thE faCts and tripLE-bOgEy rEasOning Of anand v. Kapoor
 The defendant, Anoop Kapoor, hit a golf ball that severely injured the eye of his 
playing partner Azad Anand, the plaintiff.18 As a direct result of the incident, Dr. 
Anand, a neuroradiologist, suffered “a ruptured globe of his left eye, with traumatic 
retinal detachment, causing permanent loss of vision in his left eye.”19 Dr. Anand 
brought an action to recover damages for his injuries in New York State Supreme 
Court, Nassau County.20 The plaintiff and the defendant, both doctors, had been 
friends for many years prior to the incident and were frequent golf partners.21 On the 
morning of October 19, 2002, the plaintiff and the defendant, along with their 
14. See Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 425. 
15. See id. at 427–30.
16. See id. at 426–27.
17. See Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 946–48.
18. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
19. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep’t 2007) (No. 2007-
05606), 2007 WL 5515998.
20. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
21. Id.
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mutual friend Balram Verma, formed a threesome to play golf at Dix Hills Park Golf 
Course in Nassau County, New York.22 At the first hole, each of the three golfers hit 
two tee shots and then separated, heading off toward their respective balls.23
 There was a dispute in the record as to what occurred next.24 The plaintiff 
testified at his deposition that, just as he located his ball on the fairway and turned 
around to see where the other members of his threesome had gone, he was struck by 
the defendant’s misdirected ball.25 The plaintiff estimated that he stood approximately 
fifteen to twenty feet ahead of the defendant when the defendant hit his wayward 
shot.26 Balram Verma, the third member of the playing group, also testified at his 
deposition that the plaintiff ’s ball sat approximately twenty feet in front of the 
defendant’s ball at the time of the incident. Additionally, he stated that the plaintiff 
stood at an angle approximately fifty degrees away from the defendant’s intended 
target—the hole in the green.27 In contrast, the defendant testified at his deposition 
that the plaintiff stood further ahead of him when he hit the errant shot, and was 
situated at a wider angle of approximately sixty to eighty degrees away from the 
defendant’s intended line of f light.28 The defendant also admitted that he “did not 
22. Id. There are two nine-hole golf courses located in the town of Dix Hills. Flyover: Dix Hills Park Golf 
Course, Golf on Long Island (May 15, 2009), http://www.golfonlongisland.com/teebox/2009/05/
f lyover-dix-hills-park-golf-course.html. The threesome in this case played the Dix Hills Park Golf 
Course, the shorter of the two courses. Id. The course is heavily wooded and incorporates many elevation 
changes. Id. The tall trees and hills combine to give each hole a “secluded feel that is uncommon on a 
typical nine-hole muni.” Id. The four par-fours on the nine-hole course are relatively short but still 
allow the player to occasionally hit his or her driver from the tee. Id.
23. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426. The first hole at Dix Hills Park Golf Course is a short, 283-yard par-four 
hole that plays very slightly uphill. Two sand bunkers protect the right side of a small, relatively f lat 
green. Flyover: Dix Hills Park Golf Course, supra note 22.
24. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426–27.
25. Id. at 426. Under regular circumstances, golfers will advance down the fairway to their respective balls. 
The golfer who reaches his ball first and is the greatest distance away from the green will hit his shot 
after first determining the position of his fellow golfers. If they are in a position where a misdirected 
shot could hit them, he warns them that he is about to hit, most often by yelling “fore.” “This alerts [the 
golfer] to the potential danger” afoot and allows the golfer to duck or “take cover behind [his/her] bag 
or cart.” Affidavit of Golf Professional Thomas W. Tatnall, supra note 13, para. 5. 
26. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426. Plaintiff admitted that it was customary for members of the same golfing 
group to stand behind the one in the process of hitting the ball. Id. In his affidavit, golf professional 
Thomas W. Tatnall stated that plaintiff “had just determined the location of his ball and was correctly 
in the process of assessing his position as compared to the positions of his fellow players in order to 
determine who hit next.” Affidavit of Golf Professional Thomas W. Tatnall, supra note 13, para. 7. This 
course of action conformed with the rules and procedures universally recognized by golfers. Id.
27. See Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426. Although Balram Verma testified that the plaintiff was at an angle 
approximately fifty degrees away from the hole in the green where the defendant was aiming his shot, 
Verma also testified that there was an angle of only twenty degrees between defendant’s ball and 
plaintiff ’s ball horizontally. Anand v. Kapoor, No. 15942/05, 2007 WL 7308649 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
County May 7, 2007), aff ’d, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010). 
28. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426–27. Furthermore, defendant also testified he did not know where plaintiff 
and Verma stood when he took the previous stroke. Anand, 2007 WL 7308649, at *2. According to 
plaintiff ’s counsel, “[p]laintiff testified that upon being struck by the ball, he saw Defendant 15 to 20 
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actually know” where either the plaintiff or Verma stood prior to hitting his ill-fated 
shot.29 The defendant testified that he shouted a warning when he realized the ball 
was moving off line and directly towards the plaintiff; however, both the plaintiff 
and Verma testified that they did not hear any shout from the defendant.30 All parties 
agreed that Dr. Anand was not in the intended line of f light of Dr. Kapoor’s shot.31
 The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint soon after 
depositions were completed.32 In support of his motion, the defendant contended that, 
even assuming a golfer owes a duty to shout a warning before hitting the ball, such a 
duty exists only when a person stands within the “intended line of flight of the golf 
ball.”33 The defendant further argued that he owed no duty to yell “fore” because his 
deposition testimony, Verma’s deposition testimony, and a photograph recreating the 
respective positions of the three golfers prepared by plaintiff ’s counsel each showed 
that the plaintiff stood at an angle “so far from the intended line of flight that he was 
not within the foreseeable ambit of danger.”34 The plaintiff, in opposing the motion, 
argued the defendant violated the “universally recognized” rules and etiquette of golf 
in two ways.35 First, the defendant took his shot without determining that his fellow 
golfers were not at risk of being hit by an errant ball.36 Second, the defendant failed to 
provide adequate warning to his playing partners before taking that shot.37 The trial 
feet away.” Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 19, at 4. This is confirmed by Mr. Verma, who had 
seen that the plaintiff “stopped next” to his ball, which Mr. Verma testified was only twenty feet to the 
right and forward of the defendant’s ball. Id. In his affidavit submitted in opposition to the defendant’s 
motion, Mr. Verma described the location of the plaintiff ’s ball as “approximately ten yards forward of 
Dr. Anand’s ball.” Id. The defendant testified that the plaintiff ’s ball was ten to fifteen yards forward of 
his own and that thirty to forty yards separated the plaintiff ’s ball from his own ball. Id. 
29. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
30. Id. 
31. See id.; see also Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 948. 
32. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
33. See id. On appeal, the defendant also made a primary assumption of the risk argument, maintaining that 
the plaintiff had “assumed the risk” of being hit by an errant shot simply by choosing to play golf. See id. 
The Second Department majority weighed in on New York’s primary assumption of the risk doctrine as 
articulated by the Court of Appeals: “The risks which participants in sporting or recreational activities 
are deemed to have consented to are those ‘commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise 
out of the nature of the sport generally and f low from such participation.’” See id. at 428 (quoting 
Morgan v. State, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484 (1997)). However, as the majority noted, “[r]isks which fall outside 
the scope of the doctrine are those of reckless or intentional conduct, or concealed or unreasonably 
increased risks.” Id. at 428 (citing Morgan, 90 N.Y.2d at 485). 
34. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427. 
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Plaintiff relied on the affidavit of golf professional Thomas W. Tatnall. Mr. Tatnall stated that, 
based upon all documents reviewed, defendant admittedly failed to both look for and warn his fellow 
players that he was about to hit the ball. Such failures, Tatnall opined, stand in “clear violation of the 
rules and procedures universally recognized in the game of golf.” Affidavit of Golf Professional Thomas 
W. Tatnall, supra note 13, para. 7. As set forth in the USGA Rules and Decisions of Golf, “If a player plays 
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court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, because 
getting struck by a wayward ball is an “inherent risk” of the game of golf, this was 
simply a “terrible accident.”38 The court further determined that, because no one stood 
within either the intended line of flight or the foreseeable zone of danger when the 
defendant took his shot, no duty to warn was owed.39
 Anand appealed to the Second Department.40 In a 3-1 ruling, the Second 
Department affirmed the trial court’s order which granted the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion.41 The majority held there was sufficient evidence in the record to 
establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff “was at so great an angle away from the 
defendant and the intended line of f light that he was not in the foreseeable danger 
zone.”42 Relying heavily on the New York Court of Appeals decision in Jenks v. 
McGranaghan,43 the majority ruled that the defendant did not owe a duty to the 
plaintiff to warn of his impending shot and therefore cannot be held liable for his 
errant shot on that basis.44
 Justice Cheryl E. Chambers dissented from the majority’s opinion.45 She 
emphasized that, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the Court of Appeals in past 
cases did not limit the foreseeable zone of danger to the intended line of f light.46 
Justice Chambers explained that, while a minority of jurisdictions follow a rule that 
limits the duty to warn to only those located within the intended line of f light, New 
York does not subscribe to that view.47 The dissent also distinguished Jenks, in which 
the Court of Appeals held that there is generally “no duty to warn persons not in the 
intended line of f light on another tee or fairway.”48 Justice Chambers argued that the 
defendant failed to make an initial showing that the plaintiff was not in the foreseeable 
a ball in a direction where there is a danger of hitting someone, he should immediately shout a warning. 
The traditional word of warning in such situations is ‘fore.’” Rules and Decisions, USGA, http://www.
usga.org/Rule-Books/Rules-of-Golf/Etiquette/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). Several other publications, 
including those intended for beginning golfers, provide similar admonitions. A good example is the 
pamphlet A Summary of the Rules of Golf, published by the Professional Golfers Association of America 
(PGA), which states: “Both in [p]ractice and [p]lay, always make sure that: [n]o one is near you when 
you swing the club [and n]o one is ahead of you where your shot might hit them.” Prof’l Golfers 
Ass’n of Am., A Summary of the Rules of Golf (undated) 5, available at http://www.playgolfamerica.
com/Graphics/info_devo/rules_of_golf.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
38. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427. 
39. See id.
40. Id. at 426.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 427.
43. 30 N.Y.2d 475 (1972).
44. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
45. Id. at 430 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 431 (citing Rinaldo v. McGovern, 78 N.Y.2d 729 (1991)). 
47. Id. (citing Thomas v. Wheat, 143 P.3d 767, 770 (Okla. 2006)). 
48. Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
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ambit of danger—not only because both golfers stood on the same fairway, but also 
because the actual distance and angle between the players at the time of the incident 
were disputed.49 Therefore, the issue of whether the plaintiff “assumed the risk” of 
his injury may not be determined as a matter of law, but rather must be submitted to 
a jury.50 Accordingly, the dissent would have denied summary judgment.51
 The Second Department then granted plaintiff ’s motion for leave to appeal to the 
New York Court of Appeals.52 The Court of Appeals, in a sixteen-sentence opinion, 
affirmed.53 The court chose not to address the question of whether Dr. Anand, as a 
matter of law, stood within the foreseeable ambit of danger and was therefore owed a 
duty to be warned by Kapoor of his impending shot.54 Rather, the court affirmed the 
decision to dismiss the complaint solely on assumption of the risk grounds.55
 This case comment contends that granting summary judgment for the defendant 
was improper because triable questions of fact existed as to whether the defendant 
unreasonably increased the risk of injury to his playing partner. More specifically, a 
jury question existed as to whether the defendant, who failed to ascertain the plaintiff ’s 
position before hitting and did not warn the plaintiff of his impending shot,56 
affirmatively created hidden risks of injury to which the plaintiff neither appreciated 
nor consented to. The Second Department reached its erroneous decision to affirm 
because it ignored material factual disputes in the trial record, misconstrued precedent, 
and relied on inapplicable cases. Furthermore, in affirming the Second Department’s 
bad decision solely on assumption of the risk grounds,57 the Court of Appeals not only 
managed to confuse the discrete issues of negligence presented by the case but also 
improperly expanded the controversial defense of assumption of the risk to protect a 
golfer who carelessly created hidden risks of injury. In doing so, the court all but 
eviscerated the golfer’s duty to warn others within the foreseeable zone of danger prior 
to taking a shot and absurdly ruled, indirectly, that a golfer cannot be held liable for 
taking a blind shot without first ascertaining the positions of his fellow playing 
partners so long as he ends up hitting a bad shot. As a result of the Court of Appeals’ 
misguided decision, golf in New York shall henceforth be a more hazardous game.
49. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 430 (Chambers, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 432–33.
51. Id. at 433.
52. Anand v. Kapoor, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
53. Id.
54. See id. 
55. See id.
56. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
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iii.  hOW thE sECOnd dEpartMEnt WEnt OUt Of bOUnds by MisCOnstrUing 
prECEdEnt
 Because the Court of Appeals chose not to apply the foreseeable ambit of danger 
analysis to the defendant’s conduct—instead analyzing the case as presenting only an 
assumption of the risk question58—it is important to first understand the Second 
Department majority opinion, which provides context for what the Court of Appeals 
actually ignored, and in doing so what it actually held in its short opinion. Although 
the Second Department noted that the record contained conflicting evidence as to 
the location of the plaintiff in relation to the defendant at the time of the incident,59 
it nevertheless ruled that the record had sufficiently established, as a matter of law, 
that the plaintiff did not stand within the foreseeable danger zone.60 While the 
majority casually mentioned the “foreseeable ambit of danger” language found in 
New York cases decided both before and after Jenks v. McGranaghan,61 the court 
failed to follow through with the proper analysis under this standard. This failure led 
to the majority’s improper ruling that, despite the material dispute in the testimonies 
of the golfers regarding their relative positions when the incident occurred, the 
plaintiff was not in the foreseeable ambit of danger as a matter of law.62 The majority 
reasoned that the plaintiff stood outside the foreseeable danger zone because he was 
“at so great an angle away from the defendant and the intended line of f light.”63 This 
f lawed analysis led the majority to conclude that no duty to warn was owed,64 and, in 
turn, to its decision to award summary judgment for the defendant.65 Because the 
golfers stood on the same fairway, and both the actual distance and angle between 
the players at the time of the incident are disputed,66 the question of whether the 
plaintiff stood within the foreseeable ambit of danger constituted a question of fact 
that must not be answered as a matter of law.
58. See supra notes 11–13.
59. See Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426–27 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946.
60. Id. at 427.
61. Compare 30 N.Y.2d 475, 480 (1972), with Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311, 318 (1970) (dismissing 
plaintiff ’s negligence and nuisance claims after a golfer struck a ball that injured a nearby homeowner 
despite defendant’s failure to yell fore, based in part on a lack of foreseeability), and McDonald v. 
Huntington Crescent Club, Inc., 543 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (2d Dep’t 1989) (holding that, when plaintiff 
caddy was struck by defendant’s ball, “[a] golfer has a duty to give a timely warning to other persons 
within a foreseeable ambit of danger and that duty extends to those in or near the intended line of 
f light” (citation omitted)), and Richardson v. Muscato, 576 N.Y.S.2d 721 (4th Dep’t 1991) (holding that 
plaintiff golfer who was struck in the head with another golfer’s ball when “in the vicinity of the 13th 
tee and about 20 to 25 feet from the 12th green” presented a question of fact as to whether he was 
injured within the foreseeable ambit of danger).
62. See Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426–29.
63. Id. at 427.
64. Id. at 428.
65. Id. at 430.
66. Id. at 426–27.
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 A golfer in New York owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring 
other players on the golf course.67 Indeed, “all persons on the golf course have a right 
to rely on the players’ adherence to a standard of care, based upon the avoidance of 
reasonably foreseeable risks.”68 Even elite professional golfers can succumb to the 
occasional hook or slice;69 because of this, a golfer is forced to accept the risk that bad 
shots often carry the ball wide of the intended line of play and that a player would be 
at risk of being struck by bad shots.70 Assumption of this risk, however, is a “question[] 
of fact in all but the clearest cases”71 because a participant “generally assumes the 
risks inherent in the sport, but . . . does not assume the risk of another participant’s 
negligent play which enhances the risk.”72
 The foreseeable ambit of danger standard has evolved in New York to protect 
golfers from unreasonable risk of injury on the golf course.73 The New York Court of 
Appeals has explained in previous cases that “there is no fixed rule regarding the 
distance and angle which are considered within the ambit of foreseeable danger” on a 
golf course.74 In applying this standard of care, New York courts have regularly 
engaged in detailed exploration and analysis of the facts and circumstances pertinent 
to the incident to determine whether a duty to warn was owed. Based on past New 
York cases, some of the facts relevant to this determination include the relative angle 
and distance between the players at the time of the incident,75 the players’ “general 
knowledge of the golf course [and] the game of golf,”76 whether the players are engaged 
in playing the same hole,77 the probability that a warning would have been heard or 
67. Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968), aff ’d per curiam, 
312 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Term 2d Dep’t 1970), aff ’d, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep’t 1971).
68. Id. at 632.
69. Rinaldo v. McGovern, 78 N.Y.2d 729, 733 (1991); see also supra note 2. 
70. Trauman v. City of New York, 143 N.Y.S.2d 467, 471 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955) (“[T]here is an 
abundance of authority throughout the country that participants must know that many bad shots carry 
the ball to the right or left of an intended line of play and that such a player would be endangered by 
such bad shots. This risk all golf players must accept.”).
71. Jackson v. Livingston Country Club, Inc., 391 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (App. Term 4th Dep’t 1977) (citing 
Wartels v. Cnty. Asphalt, Inc., 29 N.Y.2d 372 (1972); Rossman v. La Grega, 28 N.Y.2d 300 (1971); 
Stevens v. Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 270 N.Y.S.2d 23 (2d Dep’t 1966), aff ’d, 21 N.Y.2d 780 (1968)).
72. Jackson, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 235 (citing Stevens, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 27). An example of such risk-enhancing 
behavior is a player’s failure to shout “fore” prior to taking a shot when someone else stands within the 
foreseeable zone of danger of being struck by that shot. See Neumann, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
73. See Neumann, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 632; see also McDonald v. Huntington Crescent Club, Inc., 543 N.Y.S.2d 
155, 156 (2d Dep’t 1989); Richardson v. Muscato, 576 N.Y.S.2d 721 (4th Dep’t 1991). 
74. Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475, 480 (1972).
75. See Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
76. See McDonald, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
77. See Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 478.
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heeded,78 whether the injured player had just left a place of safety,79 course topography, 
ball lie, and even the foliage on the surrounding trees.80 Another important 
consideration is the intended line of f light of the offending player’s shot.81 As all 
golfers know, professional and amateur alike, a struck golf ball does not always 
cooperate with the player’s objectives.82 Therefore, contrary to a minority of 
jurisdictions, the New York Court of Appeals has in past cases made a policy decision 
not to limit the foreseeable zone of danger to the intended line of flight of a player’s 
shot.83 Rather—according to this line of precedent—a golfer in New York owes a duty 
to provide a “timely warning,” not only to those who are in the intended line of flight, 
but also to “other persons within the foreseeable ambit of danger.”84 In Anand, the 
Second Department effectively shrank the foreseeable zone of danger to cover only 
the intended line of a player’s shot; it did so by failing to engage in the fact-sensitive 
analysis under the foreseeable zone of danger standard as mandated by past cases.
 The Second Department began its analysis of the defendant’s duty to warn by 
acknowledging the New York rule that “[a] golfer has a duty to give a timely warning 
to other persons within the foreseeable ambit of danger.”85 As the majority explained: 
“[W]hile there is no fixed rule regarding the distance and angle which are considered 
within the ambit of foreseeable danger, ‘if the distance and angle are great enough 
they are not within the danger zone as defined by previous cases.’”86 The majority 
cited to the New York Court of Appeals decision in Jenks, alone, for this proposition.87 
In Jenks, the Court of Appeals tackled the question of whether a golfer was negligent 
when he drove a ball from the eighth tee without advance warning to players standing 
near the ninth tee adjacent to the eighth fairway.88 When the defendant in Jenks teed 
off, the plaintiff stood on another tee 150 yards away, approximately twenty-five 
yards from the intended line of f light.89 Just as the defendant in Jenks hit his tee shot, 
78. See Rinaldo v. McGovern, 78 N.Y.2d 729, 732 (1991).
79. See Johnston v. Blanchard, 301 N.Y. 599, 600 (1950).
80. See Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311, 314 (1970). 
81. See Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 429 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
82. See supra note 2.
83. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (Chambers, J., dissenting) (citing Simpson v. Fiero, 260 N.Y.S. 323 (2d 
Dep’t 1932), aff ’d, 262 N.Y. 461 (1933)).
84. Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475, 479 (1972).
85. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (alteration in original) (quoting Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 480) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
86. Id. (quoting Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 480).
87. Id. The majority only cited to Jenks for this proposition of law, despite the fact that it describes the zone 
of danger as defined by previous cases. As mentioned above, New York courts have defined the zone of 
danger by taking detailed account of the facts and circumstances surrounding the golfers at the time of 
injury. See supra notes 75–81. 




the plaintiff stepped out from behind a protective fence and was smacked in the eye 
by the ball, resulting in partial blindness.90
 In Jenks, the Court of Appeals noted the well-established rule in New York that 
“[a] golfer has a duty to give a timely warning to other persons within the foreseeable 
ambit of danger,”91 but the “mere fact that a ball does not travel the intended course 
does not establish negligence” because “[even] the best professional golfers cannot 
avoid an occasional ‘hook’ or ‘slice.’”92 The Court of Appeals then held that, because 
“there is no [general] duty to warn persons not in the intended line of f light on 
another tee or fairway of an intention to drive,”93 there was therefore no duty to yell 
“fore” before hitting under these circumstances.94 Because the defendant did not owe 
a duty to yell fore, the Jenks court therefore held that the defendant could not be held 
liable for failing to do so95 and affirmed summary judgment for the defendant.96
 Anand can be distinguished from Jenks for several reasons. Unlike the golfers in 
Jenks, who were members of different playing groups located on different holes at the 
time of the incident,97 the golfers in Anand played together as members of the same 
threesome and stood together in close proximity on the same fairway.98 Because the 
golfers in Anand were playing together on the same fairway at the time of the 
incident, the Jenks rule that a golfer has “no duty to warn persons not in the intended 
line of f light on another tee or fairway of an intention to drive”99 is inapplicable to the 
facts of Anand and beside the point. Moreover, that the golfers in Anand were playing 
the same fairway together at the time of the incident100 also weighs on the related 
question of whether a proper warning would have been heard or heeded. The Court 
of Appeals addressed this very question in Rinaldo v. McGovern and found that “the 
duty to warn did not extend to persons outside the tee or fairway, on the ground that 
such persons in all probability would not have heard or heeded the warning.”101 Also 
bearing on this question are the material contrasts concerning the relative proximities 
and angles between the golfers in Jenks as compared to the golfers in Anand. In Jenks, 
when the defendant teed off, the plaintiff stood on another tee 150 yards away—
approximately twenty-five yards from the intended line of f light—and had just 
90. Id.
91. Id. at 479 (citing Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311, 318 (1970); B. Finberg, Annotation, Liability for 
Injury or Death on or near Golf Course, 82 A.L.R.2d 1183, 1185 (1962)).
92. Id. (quoting Nussbaum, 27 N.Y.2d at 319). 
93. Id. (emphasis added). 
94. Id. at 480.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 478. 
98. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
99. Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 479 (emphasis added). 
100. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
101. Id. at 431 (describing the findings in Rinaldo v. McGovern, 78 N.Y.2d 729, 732–33 (1991)).
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stepped out from his position behind a protective fence.102 Though the relative 
positions of the golfers in Anand are disputed,103 both the plaintiff and Balram Verma 
estimated that the plaintiff stood only five to seven yards in front of the defendant, at 
an angle of approximately fifty degrees when the errant ball was hit,104 and plaintiff 
never stood behind a protective fence.105 Because the plaintiff in Anand stood in such 
close proximity to the defendant on the same fairway when the ball was struck, the 
plaintiff most likely would have heard the defendant’s warning and taken cover.
 Furthermore, the Second Department misconstrued Rose v. Morris,106 a Georgia 
case cited in Jenks for the proposition that because the plaintiff stood “at so great an 
angle away from the defendant and the intended line of f light that he was [therefore] 
not in the foreseeable danger zone” as a matter of law.107 In Rose, the Georgia Court 
of Appeals held that the defendant was not negligent for failing to shout “fore,” 
despite the fact that the plaintiff stood only seventeen degrees away from the 
defendant’s intended line of f light.108 Although the plaintiff in Rose stood at an angle 
just seventeen degrees away from the defendant, the golfers in that case were separated 
by 125 yards, were located on different fairways, and the plaintiff was located on 
another tee.109 The Georgia Court of Appeals relied on all of these key factors, taken 
together, to hold as a matter of law that the defendant in Rose was not guilty of 
negligence in driving the ball as he did.110
 In Anand, the testimony of both the defendant and Mr. Verma combined to 
establish that the plaintiff stood at least fifty degrees away from the defendant’s 
intended line of flight at the time of the incident.111 The majority reasoned that, because 
the fifty-degree angle in Anand is wider than the seventeen-degree angle in Rose, the 
plaintiff must have therefore stood outside the foreseeable ambit of danger as a matter 
of law.112 Consequently, the court ruled the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to 
102. Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 480.
103. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 426–27.
104. Id. at 426. Therefore, based on the testimony of the plaintiff and Verma, the distance between the 
golfers in Jenks, 150 yards, was at least twenty-one times greater than the five to seven yards that 
separated the golfers in Anand. Id.
105. In Anand, the evidence established that the plaintiff had stopped next to his own ball before being 
struck. See id. at 426–27. Thus, unlike in Jenks, there is no evidence that the plaintiff suddenly and 
unexpectedly moved from a position of safety to one of danger. 
106. 104 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958). 
107. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (citing Jenks, 30 N.Y.2d at 479).
108. Rose, 104 S.E.2d at 488. 
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 428. This testimony was supported by a photograph prepared by the plaintiff ’s 




warn him of his impending shot.113 In so ruling, the Second Department misconstrued 
Rose by ignoring several key facts that distinguish Anand. The holding in Rose does not 
stand for the proposition that the angle at which golfers stand in relation to one another 
is, alone, enough to determine as a matter of law that no duty to warn is owed.114 Much 
to the contrary, Rose, as cited in Jenks, holds that many factors are relevant in deciding 
whether a duty to warn is owed, including the distance and angle between the golfers 
and whether the golfers are playing on the same fairway.115
 Not only did the Second Department err in its analysis of the golfer’s duty to warn, 
but it also erred by not addressing the significance of the defendant’s failure to check 
where his fellow playing partners stood prior to taking his ill-fated shot.116 More 
specifically, a reasonable juror could have found that the defendant’s failure to ascertain 
his partners’ positions prior to hitting amounted to affirmative risk-creating conduct, 
thereby unreasonably increasing the risk of the plaintiff ’s injury. By ignoring this material 
fact, the court chose not to follow the rules as laid out by the Second Department in 
Neumann v. Shlansky117 and the Court of Appeals in Morgan v. State.118
 In Neumann, the Second Department affirmed the trial court’s holding that “the 
shouting of ‘fore’ does not exculpate careless or reckless conduct” on golf courses in 
New York,119 and found that the foreseeable ambit of danger rule applies only to 
shots played under “non-negligent circumstances.”120 The Neumann court further 
explained that the “ordinary rules of negligence apply to games and in the playing of 
games as in other transactions in life a person must exercise reasonable care.”121 
Therefore, all persons on the golf course have a right to rely on a player’s compliance 
with a standard of care based on the avoidance of reasonably foreseeable risks; the 
risks of accident in golf are such that “no one is entitled to take part in the game 
without paying attention to what is going on around and near him.”122 The Court of 
Appeals expounded on Neumann’s logic almost thirty years later in Morgan v. State, 
113. Id.
114. See Rose, 104 S.E.2d at 488; Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475, 479 (1972).
115. See Rose, 104 S.E.2d at 488.
116. See Anand, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
117. 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968), aff ’d per curiam, 312 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. 
Term 2d Dep’t 1970), aff ’d, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep’t 1971).
118. 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484–85 (1997). 
119. Neumann, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 631. 
122. Id. at 634. The Neumann court further stated that:
 The risks attendant in the game of golf have long been recognized. As early as 
1905 the Scottish court in Andrew v. Stevenson . . . stated that the risks of accident in 
golf are such, that no one is entitled to take part in the game without paying attention 
to what is going on around and near him.
 Id. (citing Andrew v. Stevenson, (1905) S.L.T. 581, 582 (Scot.)).
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in which it ruled that, “by engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant 
consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of 
the nature of the sport generally and f low from such participation,”123 but an 
“important counterweight to an undue interposition of the assumption of risk 
doctrine is that participants will not be deemed to have assumed the risks of reckless 
or intentional conduct or concealed or unreasonably increased risks.”124
 In Anand, the evidence was such that a reasonable juror could find that the 
defendant’s conduct unreasonably increased the inherent risks of golf faced by his 
playing partners because, prior to taking his shot, the defendant did not look to see 
where the other members of his threesome were located on the fairway.125 The 
defendant virtually admitted that he did not pay attention to what was going on 
around him on the first hole at the time of the incident.126 While he did not see 
anyone standing in the projected line between his ball and the hole when he made 
his ill-fated shot, the defendant admitted that he “did not actually know where either 
the plaintiff or Verma was prior to hitting the ball.”127 Because the defendant did not 
bother to check where his playing partners stood, and at what angle, he could not 
have reasonably known whether they stood within the foreseeable ambit of danger of 
being struck by his shot. Furthermore, because each member of the threesome had 
played two balls off the tee on the first hole, the probability was elevated that a golfer 
in the group would be standing within the foreseeable ambit of danger surrounding 
the defendant’s blind shot.128 Therefore, the defendant had no way of knowing which 
of the four balls his two partners were actually playing at the time of the incident 
because he did not bother to look. The defendant knew or should have known that, 
had his shot hit the plaintiff in the head from close range, it may have seriously 
injured or even killed him.129 He knew or should have known that a golf ball can 
inflict serious injury because of the undisputed fact that a golf ball is a “dangerous 
missile” capable of inflicting severe harm no matter who hits it.130 The defendant 
clearly owed a duty to the plaintiff to verify whether or not the plaintiff was standing 
outside of the foreseeable ambit of danger; yet the defendant made a conscious 
decision to take a blind shot in breach of his duty to exercise reasonable care, and 
injury resulted. The Second Department seemingly ignored this material fact in 
reaching its decision to affirm dismissal of the complaint.
123. 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484 (1997).
124. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
125. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
126. See id. 
127. Id.
128. Id. at 426.
129. Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628, 634 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968)), aff ’d per curiam, 
312 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. Term 2d Dep’t 1970), aff ’d, 318 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep’t 1971).
130. Id. at 635. 
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iV.  thE COUrt Of appEaLs EVisCEratEs thE fOrEsEEabLE zOnE Of dangEr 
tEst in nEW yOrK
 The Court of Appeals dispatched a brief sixteen-sentence opinion to affirm the 
Second Department’s decision in favor of the defendant.131 The court did not criticize 
the Second Department for failing to follow New York precedent regarding the 
golfer’s duty to warn those within the foreseeable zone of danger.132 By not challenging 
the Second Department’s failure to engage in a proper fact-sensitive analysis under 
the standard articulated in past cases, the court effectively allowed the foreseeable 
zone of danger to be whittled down to cover only the intended line of f light.133 
Although the court did not explicitly adopt the intended line of f light standard,134 
the inference to be drawn from its decision to affirm is that the foreseeable zone of 
danger now means nothing more than the player’s intended line of f light; by holding 
that getting hit by “shanked” balls is an assumed risk of golf, the question of whether 
a player stands in the intended line of f light is all that remains to the analysis of a 
golfer’s duty to warn.
 The Court of Appeals focused its cursory analysis on the question of whether 
plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury.135 The court began its analysis by reciting the 
rule, mentioned above, concerning the duty of care owed to a plaintiff by a 
co-participant in sport, as set forth in the landmark New York case Morgan v. State—
namely, that “[a] person who chooses to participate in a sport or recreational activity 
consents to certain risks that ‘are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport 
generally and f low from such participation.’”136 However, a plaintiff “will not be 
deemed to have assumed the risks of reckless or intentional conduct or concealed or 
unreasonably increased risks.”137 Nevertheless, the court chose not to apply this long-
standing rule to the defendant’s affirmative risk-creating conduct, including, most 
notably, his failure to check where his playing partners stood prior to hitting.138 
Instead, the court simply concluded, as a matter of law, that the defendant did not 
unreasonably increase the risk of injury because a “shanked” shot is always a commonly 
appreciated risk, regardless of the surrounding circumstances.139 The court did not 
explain why the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances—it provided no 
131. Anand v. Kapoor, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
132. See id.; see also Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475, 479 (1972); Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27 N.Y.2d 311, 
318 (1970); McDonald v. Huntington Crescent Club, Inc., 543 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (2d Dep’t 1989).
133. See Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 946–48 (2010). 
134. See id.
135. See id. 
136. Id. at 947–48 (quoting Morgan v. State, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484 (1997)). 
137. Id. at 948 (quoting Morgan, 90 N.Y.2d at 485).
138. See Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 946–48; Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 
N.Y.3d 946 (2010).
139. See Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 947–48.
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analysis or rationale to support this determination.140 Consequently, the inference to 
be drawn from the court’s sweeping conclusion is that a golfer who takes a blind shot 
without first looking to see where his playing partners are standing does not 
unreasonably increase the risk of injury and therefore cannot be held liable for this 
seemingly negligent conduct. This is a dangerous result for golfers standing outside 
of the intended line of f light, who, as a result of this decision, will no longer be 
protected from fellow players who take blind, unannounced shots.
 After the Court of Appeals concluded, as a matter of law, that the defendant 
acted reasonably under the circumstances, the court chose to affirm the Second 
Department exclusively on the grounds that plaintiff Anand assumed the risk of his 
injury.141 To that end, the court stated that “the manner in which Anand was 
injured—being hit without warning by a ‘shanked’ shot while one searches for one’s 
own ball—reflects a commonly appreciated risk of golf.”142 The court cited its decision 
in Rinaldo v. McGovern, alone, in support of this proposition.143 However, not only 
was the assumption of the risk defense not the focus of Rinaldo, but that case is also 
easily distinguished from the Anand case.144 The pertinent question in Rinaldo did 
not involve assumption of the risk at all, but rather “whether a warning, if given, 
would have been effective in preventing the accident.”145
 In Rinaldo, the driver of a car was injured when an errant ball f lew off of a golf 
course and crashed through the driver’s windshield.146 The driver brought an action 
in tort for negligence against the golfer; more specifically, for the defendant’s failure 
to warn of his impending shot.147 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
decision granting summary judgment for the golfer because, based on the particular 
facts of Rinaldo, the court did not believe a warning would have prevented the 
accident.148 The court saw no way that the golfer could have acted to minimize the 
chance of harm because, even if defendant had shouted “fore,” the chances were 
remote that plaintiff would have heard the shouted warning.149 In stark contrast to 
the parties in Rinaldo, the golfers in Anand were joined together as playing partners 
and stood in close proximity to each other on the same fairway.150 Therefore, it was 
much more likely that the golfers in Anand would have heeded a warning cry, if one 
had been provided, and protected themselves. Therefore, the court’s choice of Rinaldo 
140. See id. at 946–48.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 948 (citing Rinaldo v. McGovern, 78 N.Y.2d 729, 733 (1991)).
143. Id.
144. See Rinaldo, 78 N.Y.2d at 732–33. 
145. Id. at 732. 
146. Id. at 731.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 732–33.
149. Id.
150. Anand v. Kapoor, 877 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (2d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010). 
1208
anand v. kaPooR
alone to support its key proposition that the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury is 
confusing because Rinaldo is a case about the duty to warn and its facts are easily 
distinguished from those of Anand. The court would have been better served by 
citing to another proposition found in Rinaldo: “The essence of tort liability is the 
failure to take reasonable steps, where possible, to minimize the chance of harm.”151 
Checking to see where one’s playing partners are located prior to hitting most 
certainly seems like a reasonable step that the defendant in Anand could have taken 
in order to minimize the chance of harm to others. He carelessly failed to take this 
reasonable precaution.
 In reaching its decision to affirm, the Court of Appeals did not mention that the 
defense of assumption of the risk is a “controversial one,” and that there is “significant 
disagreement” as to the role it should play in a negligence case.152 Over the years, the 
assumption of the risk defense has been widely criticized by many legal scholars and 
judges for its tendency to confuse the issues in a negligence case, namely the 
intertwined concepts of negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of the 
risk. Celebrated torts scholars Dean John W. Wade and Dean William L. Prosser 
have each pressed to curtail the use of the murky assumption of the risk defense.153 
Dean Wade wrote:
Accurate analysis in the law of negligence would probably be advanced if the 
term [assumption of the risk] were eradicated and the cases divided under the 
topics of consent, lack of duty and contributory negligence. The true issues 
would be more clearly presented and the determinations, whether by judge or 
jury, could be more accurately and realistically rendered.154
Dean Prosser echoed this sentiment in his treatise on torts, in which he described 
the assumption of risk doctrine as “by no means a favored defense, and the whole 
tendency is to cut it down or even to abrogate it in some few types of cases.”155 
Furthermore, some courts have limited the assumption of risk defense only to cases 
151. Rinaldo, 78 N.Y.2d at 733. 
152. John W. Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev. 5 (1961). 
153. William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 456 (3d ed. 1964); Wade, supra note 152, at 5. 
154. Barrett v. Fritz, 248 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ill. 1969) (quoting Wade, supra note 152, at 14) (internal quotation 
mark omitted). John Webster Wade, a former professor and dean at the Vanderbilt University School of 
Law, was a “prolific scholar.” Ronald J. Rychlak, Teacher, Lawyer, Scholar, 65 Miss. L.J. 1, 1 (1995). 
Professor Wade co-authored successive editions of the definitive textbook on tort law and published 
nearly 100 articles on topics such as torts, restitution, and legal education. Id.
155. Barrett, 248 N.E.2d at 115 (quoting Prosser, supra note 153, at 456). “William Lloyd Prosser is a giant 
of tort law.” Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectual 
History, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 577 (2010). “Rarely in the history of American legal education has one 
author’s name been so clearly identified with his subject as the name of William L. Prosser is with the 
law of torts.” Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth Edition) and 
the Prosser Legacy, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 851, 852 (1986) (reviewing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984)). 
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stemming from employment or contractual relationships;156 others “have not only 
rejected any expansion of the concept, but even overruled cases applying assumption 
of risk to negligence cases.”157 The proper analysis in negligence cases, according to 
the high courts of Michigan, Illinois, and Washington, is one of contributory 
negligence rather than assumption of risk.158
 In Anand, the Court of Appeals ignored the controversy swirling around the 
assumption of risk defense and chose to invoke that doctrine alone to support its 
decision in favor of the defendant. In so doing, the court confused the separate issues 
of negligence that were presented by the case, including whether the defendant acted 
negligently, whether the plaintiff ’s actions contributed to his injury, and whether the 
plaintiff, under the circumstances, had assumed the risk of that injury. The court 
failed to address each of these discrete issues in a cogent fashion, thereby forsaking 
the opportunity to provide New York golfers with a set of clear answers and rules 
regarding what does and does not amount to affirmative risk-creating conduct on a 
golf course. For example, the court failed to explain why, as a matter of law, the 
defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances despite his failure to ascertain 
the positions of his fellow playing partners before hitting.159 The court also failed to 
explain why, despite the material dispute in the record regarding the players’ locations, 
the plaintiff stood outside of the foreseeable zone of danger as a matter of law.160 
Furthermore, the court failed to explain why the plaintiff might have contributed to 
his injury by walking ahead of the defendant, because it is common sense and a golf 
courtesy to stay behind someone when that person is making his stroke.161 Rather 
than parse each negligence-related issue in a coherent and logical way, the court 
instead chose to resolve all of those issues in one fell swoop by saying nothing more 
156. Barrett, 248 N.E.2d at 115. Illinois case law, for example, limits the assumption of risk defense only to 
cases involving a contractual or employment relationship. Id. Also, the Michigan Supreme Court held 
in Felgner v. Anderson that “the doctrine of assumption of risk in this State properly is applicable only to 
cases in which an employment relationship exists between the parties, as well, perhaps, where there has 
been an express contractual assumption of risk.” 133 N.W.2d 136, 153 (Mich. 1965).
157. Barrett, 248 N.E.2d at 115. In Feigenbaum v. Brink, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled “the 
doctrine of assumption of risk is more applicable to those cases where the relationship of master and 
servant existed.” 401 P.2d 642, 645 (Wash. 1965).
158. In Felgner, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that “[a]ssumption of risk should not again be used 
in this State as a substitute for, or as a supplement to, or as a corollary of, contributory negligence; . . . The 
traditional concepts of contributory negligence are more than ample to present that affirmative defense 
to established negligence acts.” 133 N.W.2d at 153–54. In Feigenbaum, the Supreme Court of 
Washington reasoned that “[o]ther jurisdictions treat the doctrine of assumption of risk as being 
included within the general concept of contributory negligence, and recognize that, for all practical 
purposes, the proper analysis is in terms of contributory negligence.” 401 P.2d at 645; see also Barrett, 
248 N.E.2d at 115 (holding that evaluation of the intrinsic merits of the concept of assumption of risk 
indicates that no expansion of that concept in Illinois law is warranted). 
159. See Anand v. Kapoor, 15 N.Y.3d 946 (2010). 
160. See id.; see supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.




than that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of his injury from a “shanked” shot 
merely by playing the game,162 even though the defendant created hidden risks of 
injury that the plaintiff did not appreciate nor consent to.163 In the wake of the court’s 
decision, the foreseeable ambit of danger test has been wholly consumed by the 
defense of assumption of the risk, leaving only the intended line of f light analysis 
available for those injured by a golf shot. The end result is that a golfer in New York 
no longer owes a duty to those standing outside of the intended line of f light to 
provide warning of his intent to take a shot, and cannot be held liable for his wayward 
shot for not providing such warning.
V. COnCLUsIOn (ThE 19Th hOLE)
 There is long-standing precedent in New York holding that a golfer owes a duty 
to warn to those who stand within the foreseeable ambit of danger of his or her 
intention to hit the ball.164 Contrary to a minority of jurisdictions, the New York 
Court of Appeals has, in past cases, chosen not to limit the foreseeable ambit of 
danger to the player’s intended line of f light.165 In Anand v. Kapoor, the New York 
Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether a golfer owed a duty to 
provide warning of his intent to take a shot, and whether he can be held liable for his 
wayward shot for failure to do so.166 The court answered these questions in the 
negative, choosing to affirm summary judgment in favor of the defendant solely on 
assumption of the risk grounds.167 The court declared, in simple fashion, the way in 
which the plaintiff was injured to be “a commonly appreciated risk of golf.”168
 The court chose not to examine the Second Department’s erroneous decision to 
affirm dismissal of the plaintiff ’s complaint despite unresolved material factual 
issues.169 By not addressing the shortcomings of the Second Department’s improper 
decision, the Court of Appeals allowed the foreseeable zone of danger to be whittled 
down to a nub by an intermediate appellate court holding contrary to binding 
precedent. In the process, the Court of Appeals not only managed to confuse the 
negligence issues presented by the case,170 but also improperly expanded the 
controversial defense of assumption of the risk to protect golfers who carelessly create 
hidden risks of injury by taking blind shots. Golfers in New York beware: thanks to 
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Anand, not only is the player who stands outside of 
the intended line of f light foreclosed from recovering for injuries caused by an errant 
162. See Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 948.
163. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
164. See Jenks v. McGranaghan, 30 N.Y.2d 475, 479 (1972).
165. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
166. See Anand, 15 N.Y.3d at 946. 
167. See id. 
168. Id. at 948.
169. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text.
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shot, but the player is also hereby deemed to appreciate, and consent to, hidden risks 
of injury created by careless players who take blind, unannounced shots. That is a 
good result for the wild player, but a poor one for the golfer who plays without a 
helmet and body armor.
